In this two-part survey paper, we introduce linear logic and ludics, which were both introduced by Girard, in 1986 and 2001, respectively. They o er a thorough revisitation of mathematical logic from rst principles, with inspiration from and applications to computer science. Some important keywords are: resources, geometry of computation, polarities, interaction, and games.
Introduction
Linear logic arose from the semantic study of -calculus, speci cally, the second-order typed -calculus, or system F (see [15] ). Shortly after proposing the rst denotational model of system F [13] , Girard realized that in coherence spaces (to be introduced in section 7) the interpretation of type A ! B decomposes naturally as (!A) ( B (this will be detailed in section 6), and in almost no time a fulledged new logic, with a totally innovative way of representing proofs and to execute them, that is, to perform cut-elimination, was created. We tell this story here, not in the order in which it unfolded, but starting from so-called substructural considerations. We raise the question of what happens when we remove some of the structural rules from sequent calculus, most importantly contraction. Substructural logics of various kinds have been considered much before the birth of linear logic, but what characterizes truly linear logic is not that aspect, but rather the controlled way in which the structural rules of weakening and contraction are reintroduced, by means of the new modality ! (\of course") (and its dual ? (\why not")). This, together with proof nets, constitutes the major breakthrough of linear logic.
Let us consider the implication in the absence of contraction. In -calculus, this corresponds to considering terms in which each variable occurs at most once. (Here we use the Curry-Howard correspondence between proofs and programs, see [15] ). Consider thus the set of a ne -terms built with the following constraints: x is an a ne term, if M is an a ne term then x:M is an a ne term, and if M; N are a ne terms with disjoint sets of free variables then M N is an a ne term. The key fact about a ne terms is the following:
A ne terms normalize in linear time.
The reason is trivial: each -reduction reduces the size, keeping in mind that P [x Q] is the result of the substitution of at most one occurrence of x with Q, so P [x Q] is shorter by at least the two symbols of abstraction and application that have been absorbed by the reduction of ( x:P )Q. Of course, this linearity is one of the reasons for the name Linear Logic.
In contrast, arbitrary -terms may take an exponential time and more to reach their normal form. For example, the reader may play with mn, where n = f x:f n (x) (Church numerals { here, f 0 (x) = x and f n+1 (x) = f (f n (x))).
As another instance of the phenomenon of duplication, or of multiple use of a variable (or assumption), think of a constructive reading of (8 x 9 y x < y) from which one may wish to extract a program creating an in nite strictly increasing sequence of numbers. The program extracted from the formula will actually be a procedure to produce a y > x, when given an x, and it will be called in a loop. In linear logic, this formula would have to be written !(8 x 9 y x < y).
Rather than continuing a long introduction, we decide to enter in the subject proper, and we content ourselves with giving a plan of the sections to come. In section 2, we introduce so-called multiplicative-addditive linear logic, and we complete the description of (propositional) linear logic with the exponentials in section 3. We shall not consider quanti ers in this survey paper, in any case, they look very much as usual. Then, in section 4, we illustrate the expressivity of linear logic by sketching the proof that propositional linear logic is undecidable, a property that sharply distinguishes linear logic from classical and intuitionistic logics. The following three sections are concerned with the semantics of linear logic. We rst discuss phase semantics, which is just a semantics of provability (section 5), then we introduce the coherence semantics, already alluded to (section 6), and nally we address the question of more general categorical de nitions of models (section 7).
In part II, we shall go back to syntactic issues and introduce proof nets. In particular, we shall address the so-called correctness criteria: proof nets are elegant representations of proofs avoiding some useless sequentializations imposed by sequent calculus. Reconstructing the sequentializations and thus asserting that a proof structure, that is, a would-be proof net, is actually a proof net, is a fascinating problem, that relates to games semantics [22, 1] . The last sections (a polished form of [8] ) are devoted to ludics, which while strongly inspired by linear logic takes a more radical view of proofs as interactive processes, evolving in space and time.
Here is a table of sources I have been using for writing this paper. The reader will be able to nd more complete information and proofs by going to these references, as well as to the many others that he will nd in their bibliographies or on the Web! sections 2 and 3 [14, 16, 9] (slightly revisited here in the light of ludics) section 4 [24] (a remarkably well-written paper) sections 5 and 6
[14] section 7 [26] (which itself is a survey) proof nets [14, 12, 19 , 4] ludics [17] 2 Multiplicatives and additives
In sequent calculus, depending on presentations, you can see the left and right rules for, say, conjunction given in this format:
is, and similarly for . This leads us to the following monolateral sequent presentation of the four connectives:
MULTIPLICATIVES ' A; B;
' AOB;
' A&B;
Considered as (associative and commutative) operations, these four connectives have units \true" and \false", each of them splits into the multiplicative and additive one:
(As for the terminology and for mnemotechnicity, the names 1 and 0 correspond to the usual multiplicative and additive notation in groups.) We shall synthesize the rules for the units from the requirement that the isomorphisms A 1 A, etc..., should hold. In order to prove ' A 1; from ' A; we should have ' 1. In order to prove ' AO?; from ' A; , we should have ' A; ?; as an intermediate step, which suggests the rule for ? given below. We derive ' A 0; from ' A; by the (left) rule, without any need for a (right) rule for 0. Finally, we need ' >; to derive ' A&>; from ' A; :
' AO?;
The rules are thus:
An even shorter way to synthesize the rules for the units is to formulate rules for n-ary versions of the four connectives, and then to take the degenerate case n = 0. The assumption of the n-ary O rule is ' A 1 ; : : : ; A n ; , which degenerates to ' . For the tensor rule there are n assumptions and the conclusion is ' A 1 : : : A n ; , with = 1 ; : : : ; n , and in the degenerate case we thus have no assumption and = ;. There are n rules, and thus no rule in the degenerate case. Finally, the & rule has n assumptions, and thus no assumption in the degenerate case.
What about negation? In classical logic, negation can be boiled down to negation on atomic formulas only, thanks to De Morgan laws: :(A^B) = (:A) _ (:B), from which the other De Morgan law follows, using ::A = A. This works also for linear logic, where negation is written A ? (\A orthogonal", or \A perp"). But the logical operations being di erent, negation in linear logic is very di erent from that of classical logic. In classical logic, we have both A = ::A and ' A _ :A (the latter being what constructivists criticized), while in linear logic we have A = A ?? and ' AOA ? , but we do not have ' A A ? , and as a matter of fact linear logic retains the distinctive features that make intuitionistic logic so nice: con uence (of cut-elimination), and the disjunction property (for , see below).
Thanks to De Morgan laws, we can dispense with negation as a connective, and consider A ? as an abbreviation for its De Morgan normal form obtained by applying the following rules (where we have added the not-yet introduced \!" and \?" for completeness):
(Notice that the dual under ? of a multiplicative (resp. additive) connective is a multiplicative (resp. additive) connective.) In the sequel, we shall freely use bilateral sequents in examples, but they can be seen as syntactic sugar for monolateral ones, for example
Hence, thanks to duality, linear logic puts all formulas of a sequent on the same ground, in contrast to intuitionistic logic, where there is a clear distinction between input ( ) and output (A) in a sequent ' A.
To complete the description of the multiplicative-additive fragment of linear logic, we need axioms, and the cut rule. The latter is not needed in the sense that it can be eliminated (just as in classical or intuitionisitc sequent calculus), but one can hardly use the system without cuts, which carry the intelligent part of proofs.
AXIOM CUT
(Note that the cut rule is given in a multiplicative style, i.e., it is quite similar to the tensor rule. That the axiom has this most economical format, as opposed to ' A; A ? ; , should come as no surprise, as the latter embodies an implicit weakening.)
As explained in the introduction, the main motivation for the removal of (weakening and) contraction is the control on normalisation. Indeed, the reader can easily check that all a ne -terms can be typed by the following rules:
x : A ' x : A This leads us to the main conceptual novelty of linear logic: the understanding of formulas as resources, that are consumed through entailment: in the sequent A ' B, the resource A is consumed in order to get B (think also of a chemical reaction). This is like in an abstract state machine, which changes state upon performing certain actions. As a matter of fact, we present an encoding of such a machine in section 4. With this reading in mind, one easily understands how bad contraction and weakening are. Suppose that B is some good, and A is a given amount of money, say 20 Euros. Then A; A ' B reads as: \you can acquire B against 40 Euros". The contraction rule would say that you could acquire the same good for 20 Euros. Thus, contraction is not very good for the merchant. It is not good in chemistry either: in a reaction, in order to obtain 2H 2 O you need to have exactly four H + and two O 2 . Another way to criticize the rule is by looking from conclusion to antecedents (proof-search): if you only have A to get B, your resource A cannot be magically duplicated, as the contraction rule would imply.
As for weakening, if you can buy B with A, as formalized by A ' B, why would you { the buyer { spend an additional amount of money C to get B (C; A ' B)? Weakening is not good for the client.
So far, we have insisted on a dichotomy between additive and multiplicative connectives. There is however another grouping of connectives, that was sitting there from the beginning, and that has even been somehow made explicitly by the choice of symbols: and on one hand, and & and O on the other hand. Girard Similarly, the search of a proof of the second sequent yields ' A ? ; B ? ; A (B C) and ' A ? ; C ? ; A (B C) as subgoals. Before we proceed, note an important feature of & and O: in each of the two proof constructions, the two subgoals together are actually equivalent to the original goal: these two connectives are reversible { an a rmation that we shall make formal just below. In contrast, in order to complete the proof of any of the subgoals, we have to make (irreversible) decisions. We just give the proof of ' A ? ; B ? ; (A B) (A C), but the others are similar:
The two decisions which we have made in this proof are: to choose the left rule, and then to split A ? ; B ? in the way we did, assigning the resource A ? for the proof of A and B ? for the proof of B. 
Hence we lose nothing by replacing ' ; AOB with ' ; A; B in proof-search, and moreover we can gain something, since the liberated immediate subformulas A and B can then be sent to di erent antecedents when decomposing a tensor (as in the proof of ' AOB; A ? B ? ). The O and & rules are moreover deterministic in the sense that, once the formula to be decomposed in the sequent is xed, then there is no choice on how to do it: for the O rule, just dissolve the O, and for the & rule, prove the two subgoals, which are the same sequent up to the replacement of the formula by one of its immediate subformulas. As we shall see in part II, provided a certain proof-search discipline is respected, which can be phrased as \apply reversible rules in priority", and if maximal groups of rules concerning reversible (resp. irreversible) connectives are grouped and considered as a single synthetic rule, then sequents always contain at most one formula whose topmost connective is reversible, and therefore even the choice of which formula of the sequent to decompose is deterministic. This absence of initiative can be termed passivity.
Let us examine a contrario what makes the other connectives active and irreversible. We have already hinted at this when we proved the distributivity law. Each rule, read bottom-up, chooses one of A or B, while each instance of the -rule makes a choice of how to split the (rest of the) sequent in two parts. The choice of which formula of the sequent to decompose is also non-deterministic. In other words, the two connectives are associated with some actions that must be taken.
The next pair in our list places us in the tradition of the dialogue game interpretation of proofs, which goes back to Gentzen. A proof is the work of one person, the Player (think of a student), which another person, the Opponent (think of an examiner) can check. Checking goes by tests, or plays. The Opponent challenges the conclusion of the proof, to which the Player has to answer by displaying the last rule he used. The Opponent then chooses one of the antecedents of the rule, and challenges the Player to justify that particular antecedent, to which the Player answers by displaying the last rule used to show this antecedent, etc... The play results in disclosing, or exploring, a part of the proof. We shall come back to this game interpretation in part II. Here, we shall content ourselves with an illustration, Yves Lafont's menu: 
We can recognize here some of the meanings that we already discussed. The right of the sequent is what you can get for 17 Euros. The tensor tells that for this price you get one \entr ee", one dish and one dessert. The di erence between & and is a bit more subtle, and the game interpretation is helpful here. So let us start again from the beginning, considering a play between the restaurant manager (the Player) and the customer (the Opponent). It is the Player's responsibility to split the 17E into three parts, corresponding to the cost of the three parts of the meal. May be, this is done as follows:
Now let the Opponent challenge 5E ' Q&S:
which reads as: both Quiche and Salad are available to the customer, but he can get only one, and it is his choice of picking one of the antecedents and to order, say, a Quiche. Thus the additive conjunction can be understood as a ... disjunction embodying a notion of external choice (remember that in our example the customer is the Opponent, or the context, or the environment). Let us now analyse a proof of 4E ' B&(P T ):
Suppose that the Opponent chooses the Surprise. Then it is the Player's turn, who justi es 4E ' P T using the right rule. So, the Opponent will get a Tarte Tatin, but the choice was in the Player's hands. Thus has an associated meaning of internal choice. In summary, two forms of choice, external and internal, are modelled by & and , respectively. In the case of , whether A or B is chosen is controlled by the rule, that is, by the Player. In the case of &, the choice between A or B is a choice of one of the antecedents of the rule, and is in the hands of the Opponent.
Actually, our image becomes even more acurate if we replace the customer with an inspector (in summer, many restaurants propose unreasonable prices to the tourists...). The inspector will not consume the whole menu, he will just check (his choice!) whether what is o ered, say for the entr ee, is correct (not over-priced, fresh enough...). Another inspector, or the same inspector, may want to do another experiment later, checking this time on dessert: using this sharper personi cation, the game as explained above is more fully re ected.
All these oppositions con rm a fundamental polarity: by convention, we shall term & and O as negative, and and as positive.
Full linear logic
In order to recover the power of the full -calculus (or of intuitionistic logic), we reintroduce the structural rules, but only on formulas marked with a modality (actually two: \!" and its dual \?"):
The rules are easier to explain in a bilateral format. If you want to prove !A; ' B, then contraction allows you to give yourself the freedom of using the assumption !A twice, or more: if you have been able to prove !A; : : : ; !A; ' B, then you can conclude by using (repeated contractions). Similarly, weakening allows you to forget assumptions of the form !A: having a proof of ' B is enough to get
The connective ! is a connective just as the others, and thus has its left and right introduction rules (? denotes a multiset of formulas each of the form ?A):
Our description of linear logic (LL) is now complete! The two connectives ! and ? are called the EXPONENTIALS.
A variation on the promotion rule, which is inspired by categorical considerations (see section 7), and also by considerations of the geometry of interaction (see part II) is:
These two rules together are equivalent to the promotion rule. We just show here how the second rule can be derived:
For intuitionistic or classical sequent calculus, the key result to establish in order to be able to make some use of it is the cut-elimination theorem. It holds here too, but we shall not prove it here (this is done in full detail, say, in the appendix of [24] ), and we shall rather content ourselves with giving only a few cut-elimination rules, without conviction, since a much better representation of proofs { prof nets { will be given in part II. It is good that the reader see what he gains, though!
. . .
The second rule illustrates duplication of proofs, while the rst one is the reinsuring one: cuts may vanish! ***** AJOUTER DES REGLES COMMUTATIVES *****
We can now give a translation of (simply-typed) -calculus:
into LL proofs. This translation takes (a proof of) a judgement ' M : A and turns it into a proof
where applies to all formulas of , (hereditarily) turning all B ! C's into ?B ? OC. Formally:
The reason why ' A becomes '? ? ; A (or ! ' A) should be clear: a variable can have several occurrences in a term, whence the need of a contraction rule to type it (using multiplicative and exponential connectives only). The translation is as follows (we omit the for a better readability).
Variable Abstraction
Of course, this is not enough to declare that we have a satisfactory translation. The translation should be also computationally sound, in the sense that if M reduces to N , then the translation of M reduces to the translation of N . It is the case with this translation, but it is not so immediate to establish, as the translation does two things at the same time: it factors a translation from intuitionistic natural deduction (NJ) to intuitionistic sequent calculus (LJ) and a translation of LJ to LL. There are also other qualities that one may require of a translation: for example, that it should send cut-free proofs to cut-free proofs. Another (stronger) requirement is that the translation should respect the skeleton of the translated proof, that is, the translation contents itself with introducing some derelictions and promotions in the original proof. We refrain from going into this here. Let us just say that the (LJ to LL part of the) above translation does not respect these two requirements, but other \more verbose" ones (i.e., using more occurrences of the modalities) do. A thorough analysis of the translations of intuitionistic (and also classical) logic in linear logic can be found in [10, 11] (see also [9] ).
We end the section with an important isomorphism: !(A&B) (!A) (!B) (from which the name exponential comes: think of \e A+B = e A e B "). We prove only one side and leave the other to the reader (of course, we are doing the same job as at the beginning of section 2):
Proposition linear logic is undecidable
We are interested in the decidability of the following problem: given , is it decidable wether ' is provable? For MALL, this problem is decidable, as the possible cut-free proofs of a given sequent can be enumerated. This is because in a cut-free proof the formulas that can appear in the proof are subformulas of the formulas in the conclusion (this is the well-known subformula property), so there is a nite number of them, and moreover the absence of contraction guarantees that there are also nitely many possible sequents. Think of a proof of ' ; A that would repeatedly apply contraction to A, thus searching ' ; A; A, ' ; A; A; A,. . . . This is not allowed in MALL (since the exponentials are omitted). But the complexity is high, and in fact the problem is NP-complete. We refer to [24] [Section 2] for the instructive and pleasing proof, which relies on an encoding of quanti ed boolean formulas in MALL. What about full LL? It turns out that the Halting Problem for (a variant of) Two Counter Machines can be faithfully encoded in propositional linear logic, which entails the undecidability of the logic [24] [Section 3]. (Note that this is in sharp contrast with classical propositional logic, for which decidability follows from the possibility of an exhaustive check of the truth values.) We next explain the encoding, and the structure of the proof of its faithfulness.
A Two Counter Machine (TCM) is given by a set S of states, with two distinguished states q I and q F (the initial and nal states, respectively) and by 5 sets of instructions I 1 ; I 2 ; I 3 ; I 4 ; I 5 , where I 1 through I 4 are subsets of S S and I 5 is a subset of S S S. We use the following user-friendlier notation:
These instructions act on instantaneous descriptions (ID's), which are multisets s of triplets of the form (q; m; n) 2 S ! ! (! being the set of natural numbers), as follows (where union is taken in the sense of multisets, e.g. fx; yg [ fxg = fx; x; yg):
Note that the instructions A and B can only act on triplets of the form (q; m; n) with m > 0 and n > 0, respectively. A triplet (q; m; n) formalizes a machine in state q whose two counters A and B hold values m 0 and n 0, respectively. The last type of instructions is what makes these TCM's a variant of the standard ones, which have instead two zero-test instructions for the two counters A; B, and which act on triplets (q; m; n), rather than on multisets of such triplets. The fork instruction necessitates these more complicated instantaneous descriptions, which formalize a cluster of machines working in parallel, one for each triplet, or local ID, of the multiset. A fork instruction executed by one of the machines M can be understood as launching a new TCM M' with initial local ID, say, (q k ; m; n) while M evolves to local ID (q j ; m; n). The counters are local to the machines, hence the counters of M' can later evolve di erently from the counters of M.
We are now ready for the encoding. States are encoded as (distinct) atomic formulas of the same name. Moreover, we pick two fresh distinct atomic formulas a and b, and we set a 0 = 1, a 1 = a, and a n+1 = a n a, and similarly for b. The fact that counter A holds value n will be encoded by the formula a n . We next encode rules as follows:
We have used bilateral sequents to help understanding: one reads, say, the rst kind of rules as: \exchange q i for q j and for one more a" (incrementing the counter A). We shall soon see why is the right connective to use for the fth sort of rules. Formally, we interpret each rule as a formula, as follows:
i O(q j q k )) ? ) The reason for the ?(( ) ? ) format is that we want to be able to use the encodings of rules as axioms, whenever needed, and hence possibly repetitively. We write Informally, the characterization in the statement reads as: assuming q a m b n (the encoding of the triplet (q; m; n)) and all the rules as axioms, then q F is provable, for all triplets of s. Let us observe that M accepts from s if and only it accepts from each of the members of s, since each triplet of s 0 can be traced back to exactly one triplet of s, whence the \for all" form of the statement.
Proof (indication). We rst sketch the easy part of the proof, namely that accepting implies provable. The proof is by induction on the length of the reduction s ! s 0 . In the base case we have s = s 0 , hence all the elements of s are (q F ; 0; 0), and the conclusion holds by weakening of the axiom ' q ? F ; q F . So, let s ! s 1 ! s 0 . If s 1 = s n f(q i ; m; n)g [ f(q j ; m + 1; n)g, then all we are left to prove
The proof is as follows:
(modulo the reversibility of O, and using the contraction rule at the end). We chek the case s 1 = s n f(q i ; m; n)g [ f(q j ; m; n); (q k ; m; n)g more informally, as follows:
Note that from a dialogue game point of view, the opponent of the proof has the choice of which triplet to check, either (q j ; m; n) or (q k ; m; n), whence the presence of the external choice connective & in the encoding ?(q i (q ? j &q ? k )) of the fork rule. The converse direction (provable implies accepting) goes by analysing the cut-free proofs of the encodings of acceptation, and by showing that they are essentially unique and that one can read back an accepting sequence of transitions.
Since given M and s it is undecidable whether M accepts from s, we conclude by reduction that LL is undecidable. (2) then show that the set of \possible proofs" of a sequent (i.e. the trees whose internal nodes correspond to correct application of the rules of MALL and whose leaves are sequents where consists of atomic formulas only) can be e ectively generated;
(3) then show that one can e ectively check which among these \possible proofs" are real proofs (look at the leaves).
Phase semantics
Phase semantics is a semantics of provability. Like in Kripke models for modal logics or intuitionisitic logic, a formula is not true or false, we rather have ways to express the extent to which it is true. In Kripke semantics, the meaning of a formula is the set of so-called worlds at which it holds. In phase semantics, a similar, but more structured, notion of phases is used. Formulas are interpreted by facts, which are well-behaved sets of phases.
When setting up a notion of model, one has in mind both soundness and completeness of the class of models to be de ned. This class must be large enough to include most natural examples of candidate models, and in particular it must contain the candidate syntactic model which will serve to prove completeness. As a guide to the understanding of the notion of phase space, we expose rst what this syntactic model looks like. Its phases are just sequences of formulas. The intention is that the interpretation of a formula A in this model is the set of all 's such that ' ; A. The soundness theorem will have the following form: if ' A, then A is valid, in the following sense: the special phase 1 (think of it as expressing the certitude that A holds) belongs to the interpretation of A. In the syntactic model, 1 will be the empty sequence of formulas. Thus, in this model, the validity of A is exactly the provability of ' ;; A, i.e., of ' A. With these preparations, we can now de ne phase spaces. We deal with MALL rst.
De nition 5.1 A phase space is a pair (P; ?) where P is a commutative monoid (in multiplicative notation: pq, 1) and ?
M is a distinguished subset of antiphases. One de nes the following operation on subsets of P : X ? = fq j 8 p 2 X pq 2 ?g.
It may be useful to think of the q's as observers of the elements of X and of pq 2 ? as a form of agreement between the observer q and the observed p (somehow, a degenerated form of the kind of dialogue described in section 2). We may say that \p passes the test q" when pq 2 ?. A fact is a subset F P such that F ?? = F .
The following properties are easy to check, and the reader must have seen them somewhere already (linear algebra!):
Thus a fact is a set of elements that pass the same tests, an idea which will be re-used in the richer setting of ludics. Notice also that facts obey F ?? = F , so that ? is suitable for interpreting the linear negation, provided all formulas are interpreted by facts. Notice also that ? = f1g ? , hence ? is a fact, which we use to interpret the constant ?. Also, P = ; ? is a fact.
We now de ne the various connectives as operations on facts. We write XY = fpq j p 2 X; q 2 Y g.
The rest can be deduced by duality:
(recall that ? is interpreted by ?). This determines the interpretation of formulas, provided we have assigned facts to atomic formulas. We freely say that A is interpreted by A, and if = A 1 ; : : : ; A n , we also write freely for (the interpretation of) A 1 O : : :OA n . The soundness theorem is stated as follows:
Proposition 5.2 For any interpretation in a phase space, if ' A 1 ; : : : ; A n , then 1 2 A 1 O : : :OA n (we say that A 1 ; : : : ; A n is valid).
Proof. We just check the case of ?. Suppose 1 2 . We have to show that 1 2 ( ? ? ? ) ? , i.e., that ? ? ? ?. Let p 2 ? and q 2 ? ? . Since 1 2 , we have p 2 ?, and since q 2 ? ? , we have pq 2 ?.
The following is a less symmetric, but more intuitive characterization of the notion of validity. Proof. We have to show that pqr 2 ? for any p 2 X ?? , q 2 Y ?? and r 2 (XY ) ? . Taking some f 2 X, we get that rf 2 Y ? , hence q(rf ) = (rq)f 2 ?. Since this was for arbitrary f 2 X, we get rq 2 X ? , and p(rq) = pqr 2 ?. We have to prove L = (F ? (G\H) ? ) ? = (F ? G ? ) ? \(F ? H ? ) ? . The right hand side can be rewritten as follows:
Then we observe that G \ H G entails (G \ H) ? G ? . We have (G \ H) ? H ? , similarly. Hence H ? ), from which L R follows. For the converse direction, we exploit the information that F; G; H are facts, i.e., that F = X ? , G = Y ? , and H = Z ? for some subsets X; Y; Z of P . We have then, using lemma 5.4:
We now de ne the syntactic model. As announced, P is the set of the = A 1 : : : A n 's (up to the order of the formulas), written by juxtaposition (the monoid is given by concatenation), and ? = f j ' g. Proof. One shows by induction that the interpretation of A in the syntactic model is f j ' ; Ag, and we conclude then as indicated at the beginning of the section. Let us call Pr (A) the latter set. For atomic formulas, we just x the intepretation of A to be Pr (A), but to this aim we must rst verify that Pr (A) is a fact, which we prove for an arbitrary formula A. We have to show that if 2 Pr (A) ?? , then ' ; A. It follows easily from the fact that A 2 Pr (A) ? . We check only that Pr (A B) (Pr (A)Pr (B)) ?? . Let X = Pr (A)Pr (B) = f 1 2 j ' A; 1 and ' B; 2 g. We have to prove that if 2 X ? , then, for all , ' A B; entails ' ; . We notice that A ? B ? 2 X since ' A ? ; A and ' B ? ; B. Hence ' A ? ; B ? ; , and:
We next give the phase semantics of exponentials. Like for intuitionistic logic, topological ideas are useful. In the case of intuitionistic logic, in order to avoid the tautology (A or :A), one interprets, say, :A by the interior of the complement of A in some topology. In the case of linear logic, we still have to choose the right in nite conjunction and the nite disjunction used to de ne the \closed" sets.
De nition 5.6 A topolinear space is a structure (P; ?; F), where (P; ?) is a phase space, and where F is a set of facts that satis es the following conditions:
(1) F is closed by arbitrary intersections;
(2) F is closed by ( nite) O; and (in particular) ? 2 F;
(3) ? is the smallest fact of F; (4) F OF 2 F; for all F 2 F:
The facts of F are called the closed facts. Given a fact F , we de ne ?F as the smallest closed fact containing F .
Notice that, de ning the open facts as the orthogonals of closed facts, we get a de nition of !F as the largest open fact contained in F .
The soundness theorem extends to full LL. For weakening, we proceed exactly as for the ? rule, using ? ?A. The validity of contraction is an obvious consequence of axiom (4). Using lemma 5.3, the validity of dereliction and of promotion are immediate consequences of the axioms (3) and (2), respectively.
We extend the de nition of the syntactic model as follows. We take as closed facts arbitrary intersections of sets of the form Pr (?A). Let us verify that this collection is closed under nite O's. We have proved F O(G&H) = (F OG)&(F OH) above. The in nitary version of this equality is proved in the same way, so that we get
where the last equality follows from ?(A i )O?(B j ) ?(A i B j ). Also, ? is a closed fact since ? ?0, and it is the smallest one, by the weakening rule. Axiom (4) is the consequence of two observations:
(y) ?A ?AO?A (z) ?A i '?A i ; ?A j :
(y) follows from A ' A A (by either of the rules) and from ' A ? &A ? ; A), and (z) is immediate by weakening. Then we have:
Thus the syntactic structure is a topolinear space.
We have to prove that Pr 
Coherence spaces
With coherence spaces, we give a semantics of proofs. Coherence spaces may be understood as concrete descriptions of certain sets or domains, in the terminology of denotational semantics. They are a simpli ed version of event structures [28] .
De nition 6.1 A coherence space (E; _ ) (E for short) is given by a set E of events, or tokens, and by a binary re exive and symmetric relation _ over E. E is called the web of (E; _ ). A state, or clique, of E is a set x of tokens satisfying the following consistency condition: 8 e 1 ; e 2 2 x e 1 _ e 2 :
We denote with D(E) the set of states of E, ordered by inclusion. If (E; _ ) is a coherence space, its incoherence is the relation de ned by:
e 1_ e 2 , :(e 1 _ e 2 ) or e 1 = e 2 :
Notice that the incoherence is not the complement of the coherence, since the coherence and the incoherence are both re exive. We also de ne strict incoherence and strict coherence as follows, respectively: e 1^e2 , :(e 1 _ e 2 ) e 1 _ e 2 , :(e 1_ e 2 )
Clearly, coherence can be recovered from incoherence: e 1 _ e 2 , :(e 1_ e 2 ) or e 1 = e 2 :
In fact, it is easy to check that all the relations _ ,_, _ and^are interde nable, that is, if one of them is given, then the other three can be de ned from it.
We illustrate coherence spaces with a few ewamples. The coherence space Nat=(!; _ ), where m _ n if and only if m = n is such that D(Nat) = f;g [ ffng j n 2 !g, that is, D(Nat) is isomorphic to the partial order f?g [ !, ordered by the at ordering x y if and only if x = ? or x = y. This partial order is used in denotational semantics to interpret the type of natural numbers.
We next show how to interpret the connectives of linear logic as constructions of coherence spaces.
De nition 6.2 The product, or \with", E&E 0 of two coherence spaces E and E 0 is the coherence space whose tokens are either e:1, with e 2 E, or e 0 :2, with e 0 2 E 0 (using an explicit notation for disjoint unions), and the coherence is given by:
(e 1 :i) _ (e 2 :j) , i 6 = j or (i = j and e 1 _ e 2 ):
is the good old set-theoretical cartesian product. For example, taking E = E 0 = Nat, we have that (?; ?), (m; ?), (?; n), and (m; n) are represented as ;, fm:1g, fn:2g, and fm:1; n:2g, respectively.
De nition 6.3 The tensor product E E 0 of two coherence spaces E and E 0 is the coherence space whose tokens are pairs (e; e 0 ) where e 2 E and e 0 2 E 0 , and whose coherence is given by: De nition 6.5 Let E, E 0 be coherence spaces. Their \par" EOE 0 is the coherence space whose tokens are pairs (e; e 0 ) where e 2 E and e 0 2 E 0 , and whose incoherence is given by: (e 1 ; e 0 1 )_ (e 2 ; e 0 2 ) , (e 1_ e 2 and e 0 1_ e 0 2 ):
De nition 6.6 Let E, E 0 be coherence spaces. Their linear implication E ( E 0 is the coherence space whose tokens are pairs (e; e 0 ) where e 2 E and e 0 2 E 0 , and whose incoherence is given by:
(e 1 ; e 0 1 )_ (e 2 ; e 0 2 ) , (e 1 _ e 2 and e 0 1_ e 0 2 ): Exercise 6.7 Show that the following are other equivalent de nitions of the coherence of the linear function space:
(1) (e 1 ; e 0 1 ) _ (e 2 ; e 0 2 ) , (e 1 _ e 2 ) (e 0 1 _ e 0 2 and (e 1 6 = e 2 ) e 0 1 6 = e 0 2 ))) (2) (e 1 ; e 0 1 ) _ (e 2 ; e 0 2 ) , (e 1 _ e 2 ) e 0 1 _ e 0 2 ) and (e 0 1_ e 0 2 ) e 1_ e 2 ) :
De nition 6.8 Let (E; _ ) be a coherence space. The exponential !E is the coherence space whose tokens are the nite cliques of E, and whose coherence is given by (x 1 _ x 2 , x 1 " x 2 ), where x 1 " x 2 means that there exists a clique x of E such that x 1 x and x 2 x.
Now we explain brie y the interpretation of LL in coherence spaces.
A formula
A is interpreted by a coherence space (it does not harm to use the same name, as we did already for phase semantics). As an example, we show (2) for the cut rule. We rst remark that a token of A 1 O : : :OA n is a vector e = (e 1 ; : : : ; e n ), and that (cf. the de nition of O) we have (y)ẽ _f if and only if e i _ f i for some i :
A proof of a sequent '
Let 1 be a proof of ' ; A and 2 be a proof of ' 0 ; A ? . and let be the proof of ' ; 0 resulting from applying the cut rule. We de ne the interpretation of as follows (relation composition!):
[[ ]] = f(ẽ;ẽ 0 ) j 9 a (ẽ; a) . By property (y), there are two cases: either we have e i _ f i for some i, or a _ A b (the subscript A means that _ is relative to A). In the rst case, we have directly that (ẽ;ẽ 0 ) _ (f ;f 0 ), using (y). In the second case, we know that a 6 = b (by the de nition of _), so a fortiori we have (ẽ 0 ; a) _ (f 0 ; b). Hence, by (y), either there exists i 0 such that e 0 i 0 _ f 0 i 0 , and then we conclude as above, or a _ A ? b. But this cannot happen, because we have a _ A b, hence a fortiori a _ A b, which can be rephrased as a_ A ? b and in turn can be rephrased as :(a _ A ? b). This ends the proof.
But there is more to this semantics. Coherence spaces can be organized in a category, actually two categories: the category of stable functions (this is where it all started), and the category of linear functions. The domains D(E) are closed under union of increasing sequences, that is, they are complete partial orders. It remains to nd appropriate morphisms between coherence spaces, de ned as appropriate functions from cliques to cliques.
De nition 6.9 Let (E; _ ) and (E 0 ; _ ) be two coherence spaces. A monotonous function f :
S n2! f (x n ) for every increasing sequence x n , and if it preserves compatible intersections, i.e.:
(notice that if x " y, then x \ y is a clique). If moreover f preserves compatible unions, i.e.: Proof (indication). The inverse bijections are de ned as follows. Given a stable function f we de ne its trace, and given a clique of !E ( E 0 we de ne the inverse transformation as follows, respectively:
trace(f ) = f(x; e 0 ) j e 0 2 f (x) and (8 y < x e 0 6 2 f (y))g fun( )(z) = fe 0 j 9 x x z and (x; e 0 ) 2 g :
The most interesting part of the proof consists in verifying that trace(f ) is a clique, and that the stable ordering is just the inclusion of traces. One uses the following characterization of the coherence relation of !E ( E 0 (cf. exercise 6.7):
_ e 0 2 and (e 0 1 = e 0 2 ) x 1 = x 2 ))) : The trace has an operational avour: one can read (x; e 0 ) 2 trace(f ) and x z as: \x is the ( nite) part of z which is used to compute the output event e 0 2 f (z)". Indeed, x is unique with that property, by the above characterization of the coherence, and is called the minimum point for y and e 0 The stable ordering now also has an operational avour: if f s g, then \f and g are computed in the same way" in the sense that g has to respect the minimum points of f . We show that f s g implies trace(f ) trace(g). Let (x; e 0 ) 2 trace(f ). Then e 0 2 f (x) g(x), and hence there exists (y; e 0 ) 2 trace(g) such that y x. We show that y = x, which will establish the inclusion. Suppose z < x. Then we would have e 0 2 f (y) = f (x) \ g(y), which contradicts the minimality of x. The converse implication is proved similarly.
This proposition has a capital historical importance: it is the observation of the quasi-symmetry of input and output in the traces of stable functions which lead Girard to force a complete symmetry by deciding that nite cliques can be considered as atoms, or events of a new coherence space, and hence by decomposing E ! E 0 as !E ( E 0 . Exercise 6.11 Show that for all (E; _ ), (E 0 ; _ ), (Coh l [E; E 0 ]; s ) (the partial order of linear functions) is order-isomorphic to (D(E ( E 0 ); ).
Categorical models
In this section, we describe a general categorical semantics for linear logic, and we introduce the appropriate categorical apparatus. We assume that the reader knows about categories, functors, natural transformations, and adjunctions. We brie y reintroduce other rather standard notions such as monoidal categories and comonads, as well as more ad hoc notions and axioms that are needed to complete the picture. De nition 7.1 A monoidal category is a category C equipped with a functor : C C ! C, called the tensor product, a distinguished object 1, called the tensor unit, and natural isomorphisms, also called the canonical isomorphisms:
satisfying the following two so-called coherence equations:
Where do the two coherence equations come from? As observed by Huet (unpublished) , a good answer comes from rewriting theory (a subject that did not exist as such when monoidal categories were de ned by Mac Lane in the early sixties). Consider the domains and codomains of the canonical isomorphisms as the left and right hand sides of rewriting rules and rewriting sequences, respectively:
The two coherence equations correspond to equating di erent reduction sequences: encodes
Similarly, the two sides of the second equation encode
These pairs of derivations form local con uence diagrams for the rewriting system on objects induced by ( ); ( l ); and ( r ). We pursue this interpretation in exercise 7.2, which assumes basic familiarity with rewriting theory.
Exercise 7.2 (1) Find all the critical pairs of the rewriting system on objects underlying ; l ; and r , and show that the corresponding equations between canonical isomorphisms are derivable from the two equations given in de nition 7.1. Hint: There are three other critical pairs; exploit the fact that ; l ; and r are isos. (2) Prove the so-called coherence theorem for monoidal categories: every two canonical morphisms (that is, terms over the signature f , id , , , 1 , l , 1 l , r , 1 r g) with the same domain and codomain are equal. Hint: Remove rst 1 ; 1 l ; and 1 r , and proceed as in the proof of Knuth-Bendix theorem (con uence of critical pairs implies local con uence) [ 21] .
De nition 7.3 A symmetric monoidal category is a monoidal category together with an additional canonical isomorphism : A B ! B A satisfying:
The coherence theorem still holds in the symmetric monoidal case, but needs more care: clearly we do not want to identify : A A ! A A and id : Exercise 7.4 Show that, in a symmetric monoidal category, any two canonical natural transformations between the same functors are equal. Hints: Use monoidal coherence, and the following presentation of the symmetric group by means of the transpositions i which permute two successive elements i and i + 1:
De nition 7.5 A monoidal closed category is a monoidal category C such that for all A the functor C:(C A) has a right adjoint, written B: (A ( B) . In other words, for every objects A; B, there exists an object A ( B, called the linear exponent, and natural bijections (for all C):
Notice that there are no accompanying additional coherence equations for monoidal closed categories. This comes from the di erence in nature between the constructions and (: the latter is given together with a universal construction (an adjunction), while the rst is just a functor with some associated isomorphisms. This di erence is often referred to as the di erence between \additional structure" ( ) and \property" ((). The notion of dualizing object, due to Barr [6] and introduced next, is additional structure. The last ingredient we need is the notion of comonad.
De nition 7.9 A comonad over a category C is a triple (T; ; ) where T : C ! C is a functor, : T ! id C , : T ! T T are natural transformations, and the following equations hold: (f ) = T f :
We de ne the co-Kleisli category C T as follows. The objects of C T are the objects of C, and for any A; B:
The identity morphisms are given by , and composition T is de ned by:
Comonads are tightly linked with adjunctions, as the following exercises evidentiate.
Exercise 7.10 Show that every adjunction (F; G; ; ), where F : C ! C 0 and G : C 0 ! C, induces a comonad (F G; ; ) on C 0 , where is the counit of the adjunction, and where = F G, i.e., for all B) . Show that the co-Kleisli category associated with the comonad is equivalent to the full subcategory of C whose objects are in the image of G. Exercise 7.11 Let (T; ; ) be a comonad over a category C. Show that the following data de ne adjoint functors F and U between C and C T in such a way that T = F U :
with id as unit and as counit of the adjunction.
We next follow [27] for a rst attempt of interpretation of LL. We recall that a category C is cartesian if it has a terminal object > (i.e., such that for any A the homset C[A; >] has exactly one arrow > A ) and binary products (i.e., for every objects A; B there exists (A&B; : A&B ! A; 0 : A&B ! B) such that for all C, f : C ! A, and g : C ! B there exists a unique arrow hf; gi : C ! A&B such that hf; gi = f and 0 hf; gi = g; the product is then a functor, with f &g = hf ; f 0 i).
De nition 7.12 A Seely category is a structure consisting of the following data: (1) a -autonomous category C which is at the same time cartesian; (2) a comonad (!; ; ) over C, called the exponential, together with two natural isomorphisms: Proof. We take the product on objects and the pairing of arrows of C. As projections we take 1 and 2 : We check one commutation diagram:
Exercise 7.14 Show that if C is a Seely category, then the associated co-Kleisli category C ! is cartesian closed (i.e., for any object A the functor C:(C&A) has a right adjoint).
Exercise 7.15
Let C be a -autonomous category which is at the same time cartesian, and which is equipped with a comonad (!; ; ) such that the associated Kleisli category C ! is cartesian closed. Show that there exists a natural isomorphism from (!A) (!B) to !(A&B).
Another implied structure is that each object of the form !A is endowed with the structure of a commutative comonoid: there are two arrows
satisfying the three (categorical versions of the) comonoid laws (see exercise 7.17). These arrows are constructed as follows:
This de nition may seem ad hoc, but it is actually derived from the underlying co-Kleisli adjunction (exercise 7.11) and from the comonoid structure induced by the cartesian products of C ! (proposition 7.13 and exercise 7.16): e = p 1 F > and d = n 1 F . 
We are now in a position to sketch the interpretation of the sequents of linear logic in a Seely category C. A proof of a sequent ' A 1 ; : : : ; A n is interpreted by a morphism f : 1 ! (A 1 O : : :OA n ) (confusing the formulas with their interpretations as objects of C l ), or (cf. exercise 7.7) as a morphism from ? to , for any splitting A 1 ; : : : ; A n = [ . We shall freely go from one of these representations to another. The rules are interpreted as follows:
(1) ' 1 is interpreted by id : 1 ! 1.
(?) Obvious, since ? is the dual of 1 (cf. exercise 7.7) and since 1 1 = 1.
( ) From f : ? ! A and g : ? ! B, we form f g : ?
? ! A B. (Axiom) We simply take id : A ! A.
(Cut) Compose f : ? ! A and g : A ! .
(>) Interpreting ' >; amounts to giving an arrow from ? to >. Since > is terminal, we take the unique such arrow. So far, so good. But is the interpretation invariant under cut-elimination, which is what we want of a model? The answer is: almost. We shall treat the contraction reduction in detail. Referring to section 3 for notation, the proof of ' 1 ; ?B ? ; ?B ? is interpreted by, say, a morphism h :!B !B ! C, where C interprets 1 , and the proof 0 of '? 2 ; B is interpreted by, say, a morphism g :!A ! B, where A interprets ? 2 , assuming for the time being that 2 is just one formula. Then the validation of the contraction reduction amounts to the following commutativity equation:
which is a consequence of the following two commutativity equations:
These two equations are instances of the following more general statement:
(P ) 8 f :!A !!A 0 ( A 0 f = !f A ) (every free coalgebra morphism
is also a comonoid morphism) (A coalgebra over A is a morphism f : A !!A and the free coalgebras are the coalgebras A over !A.) Indeed, is a free coalgebra morphism, by the law !A A = ! A A , and, for any g : A ! A 0 , !g is a free coalgebra morphism by naturality of . Property (P ) cannot be derived from the sole axioms of Seely, as was noted by Benton, Bierman, Hyland and de Paiva [7] (for a survey and more references, see [26] ). Below, we show how to prove (P ) assuming only one new equation (S + ) with respect to Seely's axiomatization. The reasoning could be carried out entirely in the category C, but it really arises via a tour into the co-Kleisli adjunction of the comonad ! (cf. exercise 7.11), without which the equation (S + ) would seem ad hoc.
The equation (S + ) asserts the naturality of n, between the two functors F 1 F 2 and F ( 1 & 2 ) from C ! &C ! to C, that is, for all f 2 C ! [A; A 0 ], g 2 C ! [B; B 0 ]:
or, in a form that only mentions C: (S + ) ! < f ! ; g ! 0 > A&B n A;B = n A 0 ;B 0 ((!f A ) (!g B )) :
Now we show that (P ) holds (we follow [26] [section 3.5]). We rst remark that d can be reformulated as follows: As F UA = A , this gives us a handle to use the assumption of (P ) in the proof of its conclusion: and hence the interpretation of the right hand side is, up to associativity and commutavity, ((!g A ) (!g A )) (d A1 d A2 ) and not ((!g A ) (!g A )) d A1&A2 . We shall be done if we have d A1 d A2 = d A1&A2 up to associativity and commutativity. It remains to consider the case where 2 is empty. Then one still proceeds as we did, setting A = >, but at the price of introducing a useless d :!> ! !> !>, which should be the identity up to the two canonical isomorphisms l (p 1 !>) and r (!> p 1 ). Exercise 7.18 Formulate these equalities more precisely, and show that they are consequences of the following equations (taken from [26] [section 4]) (S + ) n A&B;C (n A;B !C) !A;!B;!C = ! A;B;C n A;B&C (!A n B;C ) (S + ) n B;A !A;!B = ! A;B n A;B (S + l ) ( l ) !A = !( l ) A n >;A (p !A) (S + r ) ( r ) !A = !( r ) A n A;> (!A p) which use the fact that a cartesian category is a fortiori monoidal.
Exercise 7.19
With the help of the same equations, show that the weakening reduction and the \boxbox" reduction (I.e. a cut between two promotions '? 1 ; ?B ? ; !C and '? 2 ; !B) are valid. Hint: For the latter, prove rst that F f = !F f , for any f :!A ! B.
We have completed the de nition of a categorical model of linear logic, which we wrap in the following de nition.
De nition 7.20 A Seely + category is a Seely category which moreover satisifes S + , (S + ), (S + l ), (S + r ), and (S + ). In more synthetic terms, this de nition says that the functor F : C ! ! C is (strong) monoidal.
We end the section by sketching the proof that the category Coh l of coherence spaces and linear functions forms a Seely + category. Proposition 7.21 The inclusion functor from Coh l to the category Coh of coherence spaces and stable functions has a left adjoint, and Coh l together with the comonad on Coh l induced by the adjunction yields a Seely category whose co-Kleisli category is equivalent to Coh.
Proof. The adjunction is an immediate consequence of proposition 6.10 and exercise 6.11. For the symmetric monoidal structure, we just notice that at the level of events the canonical isomorphisms are given by:
((e; e 0 ); e 00 ) $ (e; (e 0 ; e 00 )) (e; ) $ e ( ; e) $ e (e; e 0 ) $ (e 0 ; e) :
There is a natural bijection Coh l [1; E] = D(E), since ( ; e 1 ) _ ( ; e 2 ) boils down to e 1 _ e 2 . Hence Then the closed structure follows from exercise 7.8. To see that Coh l is -autonomous, we set ? = 1 ? (= 1), and we observe the trace of l ( 1 l (id ) ) : A ! (A ( ?) ( ?, which is f(e; ((e; ); )) j e 2 Eg. It has as inverse the function whose trace is f(((e; ); ); e) j e 2 Eg.
That Coh is equivalent to the co-Kleisli category follows from exercise 7.10. We are left to verify the two natural isomorphisms. The rst one holds by exercise 7.15. For the second one, notice that D(1) is a singleton. and check that the coherent model satis es the other axioms of Seely + categories.
